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1. The coextension difficulty 
Suppose that a is F and that a is also G (for arbitrary “a”, “F” and “G”). Then I shall say that 
a case of coextension is a situation in which the following conditions are both true (where 
plural descriptions like “the Fs”, “the Gs”, etc. are intended as denoting unambiguously all 
and only the things that are F, all and only the things that are G, etc.): 
 
Non-identity: <a is F> and <a is G> are distinct propositions, i.e. distinct ascriptions of 
properties to a;1 
Coextension: the Fs = the Gs (where quantification is intended as unrestricted). 
 
Metaphysicians disagree about whether there are cases of coextension thus defined. This 
chapter is about this metaphysical dispute in the context of thing nominalism, namely this 
version of nominalism that rejects tropes alongside universals. Since whether there are 
genuine cases of coextension is contested, I shall use the phrase “alleged cases of 
coextension” to refer specifically to these situations in which it is disputed whether both Non-
identity and Coextension are true.2 Roughly, alleged cases of coextension correspond to 
situations in which a realist about universals would claim that there is a case of coextension. 
Here are some examples of alleged cases of coextension: 
  
 A cordate particular is a particular with a heart. A renate particular is a particular with 
kidneys. So prima facie by asserting that Kiki is cordate and that Kiki is renate, we are 
asserting two different things about Kiki. If so, <Kiki is cordate> and <Kiki is renate> 
appear to be different ascriptions of properties to Kiki. Yet “is cordate” and “is renate” 
apply to exactly the same particulars. 
  A triangular particular is a particular with three angles. A trilateral particular is a 
particular with three sides. So prima facie by asserting that Triglet, a particular figure, 
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is triangular and by asserting that Triglet is trilateral we seem to be asserting two 
different things. And so it seems that <Triglet is triangular> and <Triglet is trilateral> 
are non-identical propositions, although “is triangular” and “is trilateral” are 
necessarily coextensive. 
 Consider Chilito, a red and spicy particular. It seems that <Chilito is red> and <Chilito 
is spicy> are non-identical propositions. But imagine that only what is present exists 
and that, presently, the red particulars = the spicy particulars; or that only what was 
past or is present exists and that it has always been the case that the red particulars are 
the spicy particulars. Then consider that Chilito will become brown while remaining 
spicy. 
 
The first example is an alleged case of contingent coextension: “is cordate” and “is renate” 
have the same actual extension, but a cordate particular without kidneys is a logical 
possibility. The second example is an alleged case of necessary coextension: every possible 
triangular figure is trilateral, and vice versa. The third situation exhibits an alleged case of 
temporary coextension. The plausibility of temporary coextension depends on disputed views 
on the structure of time and the persistence of objects.  
By analogy with Kit Fine’s (2003) description of the debate about coincident material 
objects, I shall call pluralism about coextension (or, for short, pluralism) the view that Non-
identity holds in every alleged case of coextension. Thus, according to the pluralist, alleged 
cases of coextension always involve different ascriptions of properties to a same particular. 
On the other hand, I shall say that whoever is committed to the claim that Non-identity fails in 
some alleged case of coextension is committed to a form of monism about coextension. 
Therefore, the debate between pluralists and monists concerns the range of situations in which 
Non-identity is true. But there may be disagreements within each group regarding the range of 
situations in which Coextension holds (see section 3 below for such disagreements among 
monists). Considering our examples and similar ones, there is undeniably a common sense 
intuition – that is, a pre-theoretical and uncritical belief (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 201) – in 
favour of pluralism. This is the reason why any theory of properties that seems to be involved 
in monism is thought of as having a “coextension difficulty”. The coextension difficulty 
targets a specific family of thing nominalisms that I shall call analytic extensional nominalism 
(or AEN, for short). 
 
2. Analytic extensional nominalism 
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Proponents of AEN, contrary to other nominalists, typically purport to analyse ascriptions of 
properties (that is why they are analytic). There are disagreements among historical analytic 
extensional nominalists about the sort of analysis they purport to offer.3 My preference is to 
cast examples of AEN analyses in terms of the propositional operator “because”. Here are 
four paradigmatic examples of how proponents of AEN account for ascriptions of properties 
(for ‘a’ and ‘F’ arbitrary): 
 
 Plural nominalism: a is F because a is one of the F-particulars; 
 Class nominalism: a is F because a is a member of the class of F-particulars; 
 Resemblance nominalism: a is F because a resembles every F-particular;4  
 Natural (class) nominalism: a is F because a is a member of the class of F-
particulars and the class of F-particulars is a natural class (alternatively, because a is 
one of the F-particulars and the F-particulars together are natural5).6 
 
The first two examples of AEN and their analogues are usually associated with an account of 
properties as abundant. On the other hand, versions of AEN alike to the last two examples are 
associated with a sparse view on properties. These theories assume an unanalysable non-
logical predicate as primitive, e.g. “resemble” or “is natural”, to account for ascriptions of 
properties. But one can also combine an abundant version of AEN (e. g. class nominalism) 
with a sparse version of this doctrine (e. g. natural class nominalism) in order to get a version 
of AEN according to which properties are abundant although some of them are natural 
(Lewis 1999).  
I must emphasise that, although these versions of AEN are associated with different 
accounts of properties, AEN does not incur a commitment to properties. Some analytic 
extensional nominalists admit classes and identify properties with property classes that are 
defined as classes whose members are all and only the things that have a property. Other 
proponents of AEN used to identify properties with property wholes instead (Goodman 1966, 
211-12; see also Barcan Marcus 1978, 354). But analytic extensional nominalists need not 
identify properties with anything at all (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 56-62). For, as some of the 
proposed examples indicate, proponents of AEN can account for ascriptions of properties 
without committing themselves to properties (conceived of as classes, wholes or otherwise).  
So versions of AEN may differ greatly with respect to their ideology and ontology: 
some, but not all of them, admit classes and properties; some, but not all of them, admit a 
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sparse view of (ascriptions of) properties; some, but not all of them, admit an unanalysable 
non-logical predicate as primitive. And they can also differ with respect to the kind of 
analysis they purport to offer. Differences between varieties of AEN will have little or no 
importance in what follows.7 For the coextension difficulty challenges every variety of AEN 
in virtue of what these theories share, namely the following axioms:  
 
 Thing Nominalist Axiom: There are neither universals nor tropes.  
 Analysability Axiom: ascriptions of properties are analysable.  
 Extensionalist Axiom: necessarily, <x is > = <y is > iff x = y and the s = the s. 
 
The Thing Nominalist Axiom is what makes AEN thing nominalist; the Analysability Axiom 
makes it analytic; and the Extensionalist Axiom makes it extensionalist: according to analytic 
extensional nominalism, the identity of ascriptions of properties is a purely extensional 
matter.8 I shall sometimes describe the Extensionalist Axiom as meaning that the identity of 
ascriptions of properties wholly depends on (i) whether their propositional subjects have the 
same reference and (ii) whether their propositional functions have the same extension. A 
consequence of this axiom is that, on the assumption that there are properties, properties that 
have the same extension turn out to be identical. But I am not assuming that there are 
properties. 
AEN conflicts with the claim that there are cases of coextension because of the 
combination of the Thing Nominalist, the Analysability, and the Extensionalist axioms.9 But 
strictly speaking, the coextension difficulty originates in the Extensionalist Axiom. For, for 
any alleged case of coextension, if Coextension is true in this case, then it follows by the 
Extensionalist Axiom that Non-identity is false in this case. Thus the Extensionalist Axiom 
seems to incur an involvement in monism about coextension. However, this is so only if 
Coextension really holds in alleged cases of coextension. So it seems that there are two ways 
AEN can accommodate the coextension difficulty. Proponents of AEN can either maintain 
that, despite appearances, Coextension fails in alleged cases of coextension or they can 
maintain that, despite appearances, it is Non-identity that fails in these cases. The former 
strategy implies a certain amount of involvement in pluralism about coextension. The second 
strategy amounts to a defence of monism about coextension. I shall offer a more detailed 
account of these strategies in the next section, and I shall explore the monist strategy in the 
following sections. 
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3. Three degrees of involvement in pluralism 
According to the pluralist, alleged cases of coextension always involve different ascriptions of 
properties to a same particular. Opponents to AEN usually endorse pluralism. But prima facia 
AEN conflicts with pluralism.  
On the other hand, whoever is committed to the claim that Non-identity fails in some 
alleged case of coextension is committed to a form of monism about coextension. We may 
distinguish between three versions of monism that are each available to proponents of AEN. 
Adapting Fine’s terminology (2003, 197-200), I shall qualify these three versions of monism 
about coextension as mild, moderate, and extreme. According to the mild monist, Non-identity 
fails in alleged cases of necessary coextension but not in any other alleged case of 
coextension. On the other hand, the moderate monist about coextension rejects Non-identity 
in both alleged cases of necessary and contingent coextension, but maintains Non-identity in 
alleged cases of temporary coextension. Finally, an extreme monist about coextension rejects 
Non-identity in every alleged case of coextension, including temporary ones.  
Given the Extensionalist Axiom, AEN entails the rejection of Non-identity or 
Coextension in alleged case of coextension. Denying Non-identity implies an involvement in 
monism while denying Coextension implies an involvement in pluralism. There is an intuition 
in favour of pluralism. But is this intuition worth preserving for proponents of AEN? How 
involved do they need to be in pluralism? We can distinguish three degrees of involvement in 
pluralism corresponding respectively to moderate monism, mild monism, and full pluralism. 
The standard analytic extensional nominalist solution to the coextension difficulty, held for 
instance by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002), incurs a mere commitment to mild monism 
and so a commitment to the second degree of involvement in pluralism. But I tend to believe 
that mild monism about coextension is the least defensible version of monism about 
coextension in the context of AEN. For, AEN being assumed, any degree of involvement in 
pluralism yields a further ontological commitment, so that mild monism is the least 
parsimonious monist solution to the coextension difficulty.  
The first degree of involvement in pluralism, moderate monism, implies that proponents 
of AEN commit themselves to an eternalist ontology of temporal slices of past and future 
particulars. For, assuming presentism (or growing block theory), the Extensionalist Axiom and 
Coextension together yield the conclusion that Non-identity fails in alleged cases of temporary 
(e. g. present) coextension. Moreover, three-dimensionalist eternalism is insufficient in order 
to yield moderate monism. For imagine that the world contains just three tomatoes: a, b and c. 
Suppose that a is green at t1 and red afterwards, that b is green at t2 and red afterwards, and 
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that c is green at t3 and red afterwards (for t1 ≠ t2 ≠ t3). Then, according to three-
dimensionalist eternalism, the red particulars (a, b and c) = the green particulars (a, b and c). 
By the Extensionalist Axiom we can derive that <a is green> and <a is red> are identical 
ascriptions of properties to a, which means that Non-identity fails.10 However, a commitment 
to temporal slices of particulars would avoid this conclusion. The temporal slices of a, b, and 
c that are green are not the same as the temporal slices of a, b, and c that are red. So, if the 
extension of “is green” is the domain of past, present and future green temporal slices of 
particulars and if the extension of “is red” is the domain of past, present and future red 
temporal slices of particulars, Coextension fails and Non-identity can be maintained in alleged 
cases of temporary coextension.  
The second degree of involvement in pluralism, mild monism, implies a further 
commitment to worldbound otherworldly possibilia, i. e. a commitment to David Lewis’s 
modal realism (Lewis 1986). For, if actualism is assumed, the Extensionalist Axiom and 
Coextension together entail that Non-identity fails in alleged cases of contingent coextension. 
On the other hand, modal realism with overlap is the modal analogue of three-dimensionalist 
eternalism and is insufficient to yield mild monism.11 However, if one assumes an ontology of 
worldbound otherworldly particulars, there are (possible) cordate particulars that are not 
renate. If so, the extension of “is cordate”, which turns out to be the domain of cordate 
possibilia, is distinct from the extension of “is renate”, which turns out to be the domain of 
renate possibilia. Since Coextension fails according to this model, Non-identity and the 
Extensionalist Axiom can be consistently maintained in alleged cases of contingent 
coextension. So proponents of AEN must commit themselves to an ontology of worldbound 
otherworldly possibilia in order to be involved in the second degree of pluralism, i. e. if they 
want to be mild monists. 
Finally, the third degree of involvement in pluralism consists in maintaining that Non-
identity is true in every alleged case of coextension, and in particular in cases of necessary 
coextension. The only way one can coherently maintain the Extensionalist Axiom with Non-
identity in cases of necessary coextension consists in a further commitment to a modal realism 
about impossible particulars. For suppose that there are impossible particulars that are 
triangular without being trilateral. Then “is triangular” and “is trilateral” fail to be coextensive 
as the domain of triangular particulars contains impossible objects that are not trilateral and 
the domain of trilateral particulars contains impossible objects that are not triangular. 
The third degree of involvement in pluralism may appear utterly unacceptable.12 If it is 
so, proponents of AEN cannot be fully involved in pluralism. But we may wonder why they 
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should be involved in pluralism at all. Of course, the ontological imports of the first and 
second degrees of involvement in pluralism are not as bad as the ontological import of the 
third degree. Still, modal realism seems implausible to most philosophers. And while an 
eternalist four-dimensional conception of space-time appears less eccentric than modal 
realism, it is not uncontroversial either. Solutions to the problem of universals are not 
supposed to have such ramifications for the metaphysics of modality and time. Other things 
being equal, it is preferable to avoid a commitment to such ontologies for ad hoc reasons. 
Since extreme monism about coextension avoids such commitments, it is, other things being 
equal, the most defensible position for proponents of AEN.  
However, in what follows I shall merely defend the moderate version of monism about 
coextension because other things are not equal. They are not equal because there is an 
asymmetry between monism about contingent coextension and monism about temporary 
coextension: while modal realism is prima facie less plausible than its negation, eternalism 
cum four-dimensionalism is not prima facie less plausible than its negation, or so I believe. If 
so, then all things considered there is less pressure to reject our intuitions about the non-
identity of temporarily coextensive ascriptions of properties. Moreover, my defence of 
moderate monism against pluralist arguments can be adapted mutatis mutandis to temporal 
cases so as to give rise to a defence of extreme monism about coextension. Describing how to 
adapt my defence of moderate monism to temporal cases would be space consuming and 
slightly redundant. It is therefore left as an exercise.  
Can proponents of AEN coherently maintain that Non-identity fails in alleged cases of 
necessary and contingent coextension? This depends on whether they can resist arguments for 
pluralism about coextension. There are two such arguments. I shall describe them in the next 
section and undermine the weakest argument there. Then I shall explain how moderate monist 
proponents of AEN can resist the strongest line of argument for pluralism in section 5.  
 
4. Arguments for pluralism 
There are two related arguments in favour of pluralism about coextension. One argument has 
to do with meaning, the second argument is a Leibniz’s Law argument. I shall describe these 
two arguments in this section. I shall immediately criticize the argument from meaning. For 
my criticism of this argument will play a role in the subsequent reply to the strongest line of 
argument for pluralism, namely the Leibniz’s Law argument.  
 
4.1 The argument from meaning 
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The traditional argument for pluralism has to do with meaning. The predicates “is cordate” 
and “is renate” have different meanings and so do “is triangular” and “is trilateral”. For “is 
cordate” connotes a part-whole relation holding between organisms and their heart, while “is 
renate” connotes another part-whole relation holding between organisms and their kidneys. 
Likewise, “is triangular” connotes a part-whole relation of geometrical figures with their 
angles, whereas “is trilateral” connotes another part-whole relation in which geometrical 
figures stand with their sides. It should go without saying that proponents of AEN agree with 
their opponents that these ascriptions of part-whole relations are non-identical.13  
According to a traditional view, predicates with different meanings represent different 
things in reality. This thought is, according to MacBride (2012), constitutive of the creation 
myth of analytic philosophy:  
  
Then, around 1898, the light shone upon Cambridge. Words, once benighted, were blessed with 
representational efficacy. “[Any] terms that can be used in a proposition, have being or are 
entities,” reported Moore (in Baldwin 1901–2, 2: 421). Russell confirmed it: “Words all have 
meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols which stand for something other than 
themselves” (1903, § 51). Language and the world co-habited in a state of Edenic co-operation. 
(MacBride 2012, 135) 
 
In fact, the Russell of 1903 identifies meanings with properties. If it is assumed that properties 
are meanings, or at least that to each particular meaning there correspond a distinct property, 
then Non-identity naturally follows from the assumption that coextensive predicates have 
distinct meanings, and so pluralism is true.  
But the argument from meaning is weak, as I think contemporary realists about 
universals should agree. David Armstrong (1978, 11) has emphasised the past tendency 
among realists about universals to think that to each predicate-type or meaning there 
corresponds a peculiar universal, and he quotes Timothy Sprigge (1970, 85n1) as illustrative 
of this view. Yet Armstrong firmly rejects the conception of universals as meanings. For, on 
Armstrong’s light, universals are sparse. In general, Armstrong’s view is that, if P and Q are 
distinct properties, then there are distinct causal powers, cp1 and cp2, such that P endows its 
instances with causal powers cp1 while Q endows its instances with causal powers cp2. 
Arguably, this view is compatible with there being two predicates “is F” and “is G” with 
different meanings that are satisfied by the same particulars and represent the same property. 
We may imagine, for instance, that the predicates “is water” and “is H2O” were, during a 
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certain period, associated with different meanings. For instance, before the discovery that 
water is H2O, it was part of the meaning of “is water” that water quenches thirst, but it was 
not part of the meaning of “is H2O” that H2O quenches thirst. Nevertheless, if there are 
properties, then it seems that “is water” and “is H2O” must represent the same property on 
Armstrong’s view despite the fact that these predicates have different connotations. So 
Armstrong concludes:  
 
What we must do, I submit, is to distinguish with all possible sharpness between the meaning, 
intension, or connotation of a predicate on the one hand, and the property or relation, if there is 
one, in virtue of which the predicate applies to particulars, if it does apply to any, on the other. 
(Armstrong 1978, 12) 
 
The monist about coextension could not agree more with Armstrong’s sharp distinction: the 
claim that there are two distinct coextensive predicates with different meanings ascribed to a 
particular does not imply that Non-identity is true. According to monists, her pluralist 
opponents misleadingly believe that any alleged case of coextension exhibits different 
ascriptions of properties. And part of the reason why, according to monists, the pluralist 
entertains this misleading belief is that she illegitimately concludes from a difference of 
meaning to a difference of ascriptions of properties. 
  
4.2 The Leibniz’s Law argument. 
Another line of argument for pluralism about coextension appeals to Leibniz’s Law. The 
Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism proceeds by deriving an absurd conclusion from 
Coextension and the rejection of Non-identity by Leibniz’s Law. In this section, I describe 
Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism about contingent and necessary coextension. In 
section 5, I shall develop the monist reply to these arguments.  
Consider alleged cases of contingent coextension first. The Leibniz’s Law argument for 
pluralism in alleged cases of contingent coextension runs as follows. Let us assume that “is 
cordate” and “is renate” are coextensive, hence that (1) is true:  
 
(1) The cordate particulars = the renate particulars. 
 
From (1) and the Extensionalist Axiom, we can derive 
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(2) <Kiki is cordate> = <Kiki is renate>. 
 
(2) implies that Non-identity is false in this situation. However, since coextension is only 
contingent in this case, there might have been a cordate particular that is not renate, or the 
other way around. For the sake of the argument, I shall assume that Kiki is not essentially 
renate, i.e. that it could have had no kidneys. Imagine, for instance, that Kiki lost its kidneys 
in a crash and benefits from a bionic prosthesis that plays each of the functional roles that are 
naturally played by kidneys. This counterfactual situation represents a possibility according to 
which it is true that Kiki is cordate but false that Kiki is renate. So the following is true: 
 
(3) <Kiki is cordate> and <Kiki is renate> are such that they might have distinct truth 
values. 
 
Necessarily, propositions that have distinct truth values are distinct. So (4) follows from (3): 
 
(4) <Kiki is cordate> and <Kiki is renate> are such that they might be distinct 
ascriptions of properties to Kiki. 
 
However by Leibniz’s Law, (2) and (4) yield (5): 
 
(5) <Kiki is cordate> and <Kiki is cordate> are such that they might be distinct 
ascriptions of properties to Kiki. 
 
But (5) is absurd. Nothing, and a fortiori no ascription of a property, may be distinct from 
itself. Therefore, by reductio it seems that (2) is false, or so the argument goes. But if (2) is 
false, Non-identity is true in alleged cases of contingent coextension. 
A similar but weaker argument can be proposed in favour of pluralism about alleged 
cases of necessary coextension. “Triangular particulars” and “trilateral particulars” are co-
referring terms that, by Leibniz’s Law, we should be able to substitute salva veritate in 
extensional contexts. It is true that triangular particulars are so-called because of their having 
three angles. However, it is false that trilateral particulars are so-called because of their 
having three angles. For trilateral particulars are called “trilateral” not in virtue of their having 
three angles but in virtue of their having three sides. This may be thought of as indicating that 
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ascriptions of triangularity and of trilaterality to a particular are distinct ascriptions of a 
property to this particular.  
I believe that these arguments are susceptible to reach the conviction of many readers. 
But I do not believe them to be conclusive. I shall explain why in the next section. 
 
5. The monist reply to Leibniz’s Law arguments 
5.1 Opacity 
I do not believe that Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism about coextension are irresistible 
and this is the reason why I believe that proponents of AEN can be moderate monists about 
coextension. The argument for pluralism about contingent coextension is structurally similar 
to a familiar line of argument for the non-identity of coincident material objects. The statue 
(Goliath) and the lump of clay (Lumpl) coincide. The lump of clay may be reshaped in the 
shape of a ball. The statue may not be reshaped in the shape of a ball. Therefore, the statue 
and the lump of clay are non-identical, or so the argument goes. But it is well-known that 
monists about coincident objects have replied to such arguments that they are based on 
linguistic illusions. I believe that monist proponents of analytic extensional nominalism can 
maintain that Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism about coextension are based on similar 
illusions.  
Consider the Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism in cases of necessary coextension 
first. There is no doubt that this argument is based on a linguistic illusion. For it is analogous 
to Quine’s famous “Giorgione was so-called because of his size”. Giorgione is identical to 
Barbarelli. But while it is true that Giorgione was so-called because of his size, it is false that 
Barbarelli was so-called because of his size. The predicate “is so-called because of his size” 
generates an opaque context. We cannot substitute co-referential terms salva veritate in this 
context. For the truth value of these predications varies with the way something is called. So a 
failure of Leibniz’s Law in such a context is not a reliable guide to non-identity. Similarly, the 
context introduced by the predicate “are so-called because of their having three angles” is 
opaque for the same reason. The truth value of predications of this predicate varies depending 
on the way things are called. So from the conjunction of “triangular particulars are so-called 
because of their having three angles” with the negation of “trilateral particulars are so-called 
because of their having three angles” we cannot conclude by Leibniz’s Law that ascriptions of 
triangularity are distinct from ascriptions of trilaterality.  
Harold Noonan (1991) calls abelardian a predicate, “is F”, if it is such that, from the 
claim that a satisfies “is F” and the claim that b fails to satisfy “is F”, we cannot conclude by 
Coextension and identity     12 
 
 
Leibniz’s Law that a and b are non-identical. “Is so-called because of its size” is abelardian. 
Noonan’s terminology can be adapted to plural contexts. Following Oliver and Smiley (2013), 
I shall use “x”, “y”, etc. as plural variables. So, in general, the predicate “are F” will be said to 
be abelardian iff, for any x and y, from the claim that x are F and the claim that y are not F we 
cannot conclude by Leibniz’s Law that x ≠ y. In other words, abelardian predicates generate 
opaque contexts. The predicate “are so-called because of their having three angles” is 
abelardian because from the claim that the triangular particulars are so-called because of their 
having three angles and the negation of the claim that the trilateral particulars are so-called 
because of their having three angles we cannot conclude that the triangular particulars are 
distinct from the trilateral ones. Indeed, they are the same particulars. 
An abelardian predicate is abelardian because its satisfaction is affected by the way we 
refer to or conceive of its subjects (Noonan 1991, 188). I shall reserve the term “guise” to talk 
about these ways things are referred to or conceived of. So the triangular/trilateral figures 
have a triangular guise and a trilateral guise. When we think of them as triangular particulars, 
we generate a context in which we assign great importance to their triangular guise. When we 
think of them as trilateral particulars, we generate a context in which we assign great 
importance to their trilateral guise. But, of course, these different guises should not be thought 
of as being different properties in the context of monist AEN: a triangularity property and a 
trilaterality property. For even monist proponents of AEN who admit properties deny that 
these are non-identical properties. So I suggest that guises are determined by the connotation, 
the meaning, of predicates. Thus the triangular guise of triangular figures is determined by 
what the predicate “is triangular” connotes. Likewise, the trilaterality guise of trilateral figures 
is determined by what the predicate “is trilateral” connotes. These two predicates, “is 
triangular” and “is trilateral” have distinct connotations. And as the discussion of the 
argument from meaning has shown, we cannot conclude from a difference in meanings of 
predicates to a difference of ascriptions of properties (see section 4.1).  
I have explained earlier that the standard view about coextension in analytic extensional 
nominalism is mild monism, namely the view that Non-identity fails only in cases of 
necessary coextension. I think that mild monists should agree with my reply to Leibniz’s Law 
arguments for pluralism in cases of necessary coextension. But this line of reply can be 
extended to alleged cases of contingent coextension. 
In order to do so, moderate monists should first claim that cordate/renate particulars 
have a cordate and a renate guise. When we think of these particulars as cordate particulars, 
we conceive of them under their cordate guise; when we think of them as renate particulars, 
Coextension and identity     13 
 
 
we conceive of them under their renate guise. But we need not think of these different guises 
as different properties: being renate and being cordate. A moderate monist can claim that the 
cordate guise of cordate particulars is determined by what the predicate “is cordate” connotes, 
namely a relation between organisms and their heart; while the renate guise of renate 
particulars is determined by what the predicate “is renate” connotes, namely, a relation 
between organisms and their kidneys. In a similar vein, a moderate monist about coextension 
can say that the names “<Kiki is renate>” and “<Kiki is cordate>” refer to a single proposition 
under different guises: a renate and a cordate guise. When we refer to or conceive of this 
proposition as the proposition that Kiki is renate we refer to or conceive of it under its renate 
guise. When we refer to or conceive of it as the proposition that Kiki is cordate we refer to or 
conceive of it under its cordate guise. 
Second, it is well-known that monists about coincident material objects have argued that 
predicates involving a modal modifier are abelardian. Consider the following emendation of 
Quine’s famous example. 8 is necessarily greater than 7. The number of planets in the solar 
system is contingently greater than 7. However, we would not want to conclude that the 
number of planets in the solar system is not identical to 8. For it is identical to 8 (Pluto is not a 
planet). So predicates involving a modal modifier generate opaque contexts because they are 
sensible to guises.  
But the claim that predicates involving modal modifiers generate opaque contexts can 
also provide a solution to the Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism about contingent 
coextension. For this argument crucially appeals to (4), namely the claim that <Kiki is 
cordate> and <Kiki is renate> might be non-identical ascriptions of properties to Kiki. On the 
other hand, we derived the absurd (5) from (2) and (4) by Leibniz’s Law. However, if the 
context introduced by the predicate “might be distinct ascriptions of properties to Kiki” is 
opaque, then we cannot validly appeal to Leibniz’s Law in order to derive (5) from (2) and 
(4). Therefore, moderate monists can block Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism about 
coextension. 
 
5.2 Moderate monism and counterpart theory 
The preceding reply to Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism about coextension can be, but 
need not be, implemented in counterpart theoretic terms provided that the relevant counterpart 
theory is compatible with an actualist account of modality (more on this proviso at the end of 
this section). For it is analogous to the monist reply to Leibniz’s Law arguments for the non-
identity of persons and bodies that Lewis (1971) famously implemented using his counterpart 
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theory. What kind of counterpart theory would be required? One may think of a counterpart 
theory for properties as developed by Heller (1998). Philosophers have appealed to such a 
counterpart theory in other contexts (Ehring 2004, Ball 2011), and I have myself proposed to 
use a counterpart theory for properties in order to solve the coextension difficulty once 
(Guigon 2009). But a counterpart theory for properties would only serve these proponents of 
AEN who are committed to properties (nominalistically conceived). Yet versions of analytic 
extensional nominalism according to which there are no properties are challenged by 
Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism about contingent coextension too. Therefore, I have 
come to believe that a counterpart theory for propositions better suits the monist needs.  
There are independent reasons to embrace a counterpart theory for propositions once we 
endorse a counterpart theory for individuals. Cian Dorr (2005) has argued that counterpart 
theorists need a counterpart theory for propositions in order to account for modal judgements 
about propositions. Dorr (2005, 217) acknowledges that Lewis (1986, 253) holds that in some 
contexts identity pairs can have non-identity pairs as counterparts. On this basis, Dorr 
suggests that we may want to say things like “although the proposition that a is F is identical 
to the proposition that b is F, the former could have been true while the latter is false” 
(consider, for instance, the propositions that I am human and that my body is human). A 
counterpart theory for propositions allows us to make sense of such a claim by interpreting it 
as meaning that a pair of identical propositions can have a non-identity pair of propositions as 
counterparts. In a similar vein, monist proponents of AEN must be able to say that although 
the proposition that a is F is identical to the proposition that a is G the former could have been 
true while the latter is false in order to solve the Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism. A 
counterpart theory for propositions would allow them to make perfect sense of such a claim. 
For the proponent of AEN can maintain that, properly interpreted, the possibility that Kiki has 
no kidney only warrants the judgement that the identity pair of propositions <Kiki is cordate> 
and <Kiki is renate> have a non-identity pair of propositions as counterparts. 
Appealing to a counterpart theory for propositions in the present context is not ad hoc. 
For, given the Extensionalist Axiom and a counterpart theory for individuals, a commitment to 
a counterpart theory for propositions is congenial. According to the Extensionalist Axiom, 
propositions derive their identity from the identity of the reference of their propositional 
subjects and of the extension of their propositional functions. Counterpart theorists maintain 
that the identity of individuals is bound to a world, hence that individuals are worldbound. 
Therefore, it follows from the Extensionalist Axiom that, if individuals are worldbound, so are 
propositions. But if propositions are worldbound, if their identity is fixed to a world, then the 
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most natural way to account for their being possibly or necessarily true is in counterpart 
theoretic terms: <P> is possibly true if and only if <P> has a true counterpart in some world; 
<P> is necessarily true if and only if every counterpart of <P> is true.  
How should we account for counterpart relations between propositions? Again, the 
Extensionalist Axiom indicates us how to do so. According to AEN, the identity of a 
proposition is function of the identity of the semantic values of its propositional subject and 
its propositional function. This suggests that proponents of AEN should conceive of 
counterpart relations between propositions as jointly determined by (i) counterpart relations 
between semantic values of propositional subjects and (ii) counterpart relations between 
extensions of propositional functions. Thus, 
 
Propositional counterparthood: <x is > is a counterpart of <y is > iff x is a 
counterpart of y and the s are plural counterparts of the s. 
 
Lewis’s counterpart theory tells us when an individual is a counterpart of an individual. But it 
does not tell us when several individuals are counterparts of several individuals. So in order 
to adequately account for relations of counterparthood between propositions we need an 
account of plural predications of counterparthood, i.e. a plural counterpart theory. 
The suitable plural counterpart theory must allow us to say that possible cordate 
particulars are, collectively, plural counterparts of the actual cordate/renate particulars under 
the appropriate counterpart relation and that possible renate particulars are, collectively, 
plural counterparts of the actual cordate/renate particulars under another counterpart relation. 
Suppose thus that Kika is Kiki’s cordate counterpart in w1, and suppose that x1, …, xn are the 
cordate counterparts of the actual cordate/renate particulars in w1. Let us use the rigidified 
definite description “the w1-cordates” in order to refer to x1, …, xn. Then the proposition that 
Kika is among the w1-cordates – or simply <Kika is w1-cordate> – is a cordate propositional 
counterpart of the proposition <Kiki is cordate>. 
Lewis’s (1968) original counterpart theory is singularist in that his counterpart relations 
are binary relations holding between at most two particulars. Thus, in the modal context, 
Lewis’s relation of counterparthood is defined as follows: 
 
Singular counterpart: for all x and y, x is a counterpart of y iff (i) x is similar to y and (ii) 
there is no z in x’s world such that z is more similar to y than x is. 
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According to Lewis’s counterpart theory, a particular a is possibly F iff a has a counterpart 
that is F; and a is necessarily F iff every counterpart of x is F. 
By contrast, the basic idea of a plural counterpart theory is to appeal to a plural 
predicate of counterparthood, i.e. a dyadic predicate of counterparthood that can be saturated 
by plural terms. Using ‘x’, ‘y’, etc. to stand for plural variables, plural counterparthood can be 
defined thus: 
 
Plural Counterpart: for all x and y, x are counterparts of y iff (i) x are similar to y and 
(ii) for any z distinct from x in the world of which x are parts, it is not the case that z are 
more similar to y than x are (where x ≠ z iff x such that x is among x but not among z 
or x is among z but not among x). 
 
It should be noticed that the predicate “are counterparts of” is understood as being such that it 
is not analytic that from “x are counterparts of y” we can derive that every x among x has a 
counterpart among y. Whether we can make such an inference depends on the context and the 
relevant counterpart relation. In some contexts, the inference is clearly invalid. For instance, 
we might want to say things like “The Rolling Stones might have another guitarist”. 
According to a plural counterpart theory, this statement is true iff the Rolling Stones have 
counterparts in some world w that together constitute a band and are such that no counterpart 
of Keith Richards is their guitarist.14 
The basic vocabulary of a plural counterpart theory is the following: 
 
Wx (x is a possible world)15 
I(x,y) (x are in possible world y) 
Ax (x are actual) 
C(x,y) (x are counterparts of y) 
 
The basic postulates of such a plural counterpart theory are the following:16 
 
P1: x y (I(x,y)  Wy) 
(No things are in anything except a world) 
P2: x y z ((I(x,y) & I(x,z))  y = z) 
(No things exist in two worlds) 
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P3: x y (C(x,y)  z I(x,z)) 
 (Any things that are counterparts are in some world) 
P4: x y (C(x,y)  z I(y,z))  
 (Any things that have counterparts are in some world)  
P6: x y (I(x,y)  C(x,x)) 
 (Any things in any world are counterparts of themselves) 
P7: x (Wx & y (I(y,x)  Ay)) 
 (Some world is such that all and only its inhabitants are actual) 
P8: x Ax 
 (Some things are actual) 
 
So, according to an absolute plural counterpart theory, x are possibly F iff, there are a world w 
and some inhabitants y of w, such that y are counterparts of x and y are F. On the other hand, 
x are necessarily F iff, for all y such that y are counterparts of x, y are F. 
Lewis (1971) famously adapted his counterpart theory in such a way that things can 
have different guise counterparts. He did so in order to defend a monist reply to Leibniz’s 
Law arguments about the contingent coincidence of bodies and persons. Thus, on his account, 
I have a bodily and a personal guise. Although Lewis does account for guises in terms of 
properties, we need not do so (see section 5.1). We also need to distinguish between several 
plural counterpart relations in order to implement the monist reply to Leibniz’s Law 
arguments for pluralism about coextension. For we want to be able to distinguish between the 
cordate counterparts of cordate/renate particulars and the renate counterparts of the 
cordate/renate particulars in order to be able to say that the actual cordate/renate particulars 
are such that, in some world, their renate and their cordate counterparts are not the same 
particulars. The precise formulation of this claim is the following: 
 
(5) There are a world w, a unique plurality of cordate counterparts x in w of the cordate 
particulars, and a unique plurality of renate counterparts y in w of the renate particulars, 
such that x and y are not the same particulars.  
  
Now the Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism about contingent coextension is based on the 
possibility that Kiki could be cordate without being renate. On this scenario, (3), namely the 
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claim that <Kiki is cordate> and <Kiki is renate> might have distinct truth values, is true. But, 
given counterpart theory, (3) receives the following interpretation: 
 
(3’) There are a world w, a unique cordate counterpart <P> in w of <Kiki is cordate>, 
and a unique renate counterpart <Q> in w of <Kiki is renate>, such that <P> is true and 
<Q> is false. 
 
Given propositional counterparthood the cordate counterpart <P> of <Kiki is cordate> is the 
proposition whose subject refers to the w-counterpart of Kiki and whose propositional 
function has the w-cordate counterparts of the actual cordate particulars for extension. This 
proposition is true at w if the w-counterpart of Kiki is among the w-cordate counterparts of the 
actual cordate particulars. The renate counterpart <Q> of <Kiki is cordate> is the proposition 
whose subject refers to the w-counterpart of Kiki and whose propositional function has the w-
renate counterparts of the actual renate particulars for extension. This proposition is false if 
the w-counterpart of Kiki is not among the w-renate counterparts of the actual renate 
particulars. (3’) is true in the assumed scenario. For by saying that Kiki could have been 
cordate without being renate, we are introducing a context in which Kiki’s counterpart is 
among the counterparts of the cordate particulars but not among the counterparts of the renate 
particulars. From (3’) we can derive the following counterpart theoretic interpretation of (4): 
 
(4’) There are a world w, a unique cordate counterpart <P> in w of <Kiki is cordate>, 
and a unique renate counterpart <Q> in w of <Kiki is renate>, such that <P> ≠ <Q>. 
 
On the other hand, the counterpart theoretic translation of (5) is the following: 
 
(5’) There are a world w, a unique cordate counterpart <P> in w of <Kiki is cordate>, 
such that <P> ≠ <P>. 
 
Of course, (5’) is as absurd as (5) is. However, (5’) does not logically follow from (2) and (4’) 
by Leibniz’s Law. Therefore, given a counterpart theoretic interpretation of the premises of 
the Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism in alleged cases of coextension, this argument does 
not go through. So it does not refute moderate monism.17  
Nevertheless, although a counterpart theory for propositions allows us to block 
Leibniz’s Law arguments, this way of implementing the moderate monist solution to the 
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coextension difficulty is useful only if it is compatible with a version of actualism. For the 
main reason to prefer moderate monism over mild monism is that the former doctrine is 
supposed to avoid the latter doctrine’s commitment to modal realism. Our preference would 
be illegitimate if, at the end, moderate monist proponents of AEN also had to commit 
themselves to modal realism because they maintain a counterpart theory for propositions.  
But, first, it is important to notice that it is not compulsory for moderate monists to 
endorse any counterpart theory. For there are several ways one can implement the monist 
reply to Leibniz’s Law arguments for pluralism that was suggested in section 5.1. The 
advantage of using counterpart theory is that counterpart theory allows us to account for the 
opacity of the relevant linguistic contexts: the opacity is due to the context-relativity of 
overall similarity. Second, I claim that the proposed counterpart theory for propositions is 
compatible with linguistic ersatzism, which is a form of actualism.18 Therefore, I claim that 
proponents of analytic extensional nominalism can appeal to the proposed counterpart theory 
for propositions in order to defend a moderate monism about coextension.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
My main goal in this chapter has been to show that nominalists who are committed to each of 
the Thing Nominalist, Analysability, and Extensionalist axioms can coherently endorse a 
moderate monist solution to the coextension difficulty. I have explained that there are two 
ways proponents of AEN can accommodate alleged cases of coextension: they can be 
pluralists or monists about alleged cases of both contingent and temporary coextension, but 
they have to be monists about alleged cases of necessary coextension if genuine impossible 
worlds are unacceptable. Although proponents of AEN usually endorse a mild monism 
according to which Non-identity is true in alleged cases of contingent and temporary 
coextension, I have argued that the monist response to the difficulty of necessary coextension 
can be coherently extended to alleged cases of contingent coextension as well. This gives rise 
to a moderate monism about coextension. I have explained how moderate monists can appeal 
to a counterpart theory for propositions in order to block the Leibniz’s Law argument for 
pluralism about coextension.  
On the other hand, my goal has not been to argue that moderate monism about 
coextension is true nor has it been to argue that, contrary to appearances, moderate monism is 
intuitive. What I deny, however, is that the view is too counterintuitive to be plausible at all. 
What at first strikes many as counterintuitive about the monist strategy is the rejection of Non-
identity. But Non-identity is a claim about the identity of propositions. Like Lewis (1986, 246) 
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and others, I do not believe that we have strong pre-theoretic intuitions about the nature and 
identity of propositions or that these intuitions are compelling. Propositions are theoretical 
entities. So what their identity conditions are is a theoretical issue. The moderate monist AE-
Nominalist thinks that there are good theoretical reasons to deny Non-identity. For she thinks 
that she has independent reasons to maintain that each of her axioms is true and that it is 
better to avoid a commitment to modal realism. These theoretical reasons are legitimate, while 
alleged intuitions about the identity of propositions are objectionable. So I do not think that 
appealing to intuitions about propositions is sufficient to undermine the rejection of Non-
identity. Moreover, it should be taken into account that monist proponents of AEN provide an 
explanation of our misleading beliefs about the identity of ascriptions of properties. These 
beliefs are rooted in phenomena of opacity and the fact that we are often confused about the 
relationship between meanings and properties. 
Part of the reason why, it seems to me, opponents to monism about coextension claim 
that this view is too counterintuitive to be a serious option is that they believe that there are 
coextensive properties and that they conceive of monism about coextension as the view that 
coextensive properties are identical (see this volume, chapters 6 and 7). Agreed: the claim that 
there are identical coextensive properties in alleged cases of coextension is very 
counterintuitive. But even if one assumes that intuitions are a guide to plausibility in 
metaphysics (which one can dispute), this merely implies that the most plausible versions of 
analytic extensional nominalism are those that are not committed to (nominalistically 
construed) properties.  
 
 
NOTES 
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1.  I follow the usual custom of letting expressions like “<a is F>”, “<a is G>” etc. stand for the 
proposition that a is F, the proposition that a is G, etc. 
2.  Alleged cases of coextension being thus conceived, a situation in which two predicates “is F” and “is 
G” are coextensive and satisfied by an object a, and in which there is no doubt that <a is F> and <a is 
G> are identical (e.g. because we know that “is F” and “is G” are synonymous) is not an alleged case 
of coextension. 
3.  Some have proposed reductive analyses, conceptual analyses, or paraphrase schema. 
4.  This is a simplification of Rodriguez-Pereyra’s account; see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002. But every 
(other) version of resemblance nominalism – e.g. Price’s (1953, 20) version of aristocratic 
resemblance nominalism and the version Lewis (1999, 14-5) suggested – is a version of AEN. 
5.  See Dorr 2008, 47-8. 
6.  AEN analyses of ascriptions of polyadic properties usually appeal to n-tuples of things. I will focus 
on ascriptions of monadic properties in this chapter. But my arguments can easily be recast in such a 
way that my conclusions hold for ascriptions of polyadic properties as well. 
7.  The difference between sparse and abundant versions of AEN only matters with respect to the choice 
of examples. If there is a property of being cordate and a property of being renate, then these 
properties do not seem very natural. Still, alleged cases of coextension involving ascriptions of sparse 
properties are conceivable, although it is difficult to produce uncontroversial examples. My strategy 
in this chapter is to stick to canonical examples of coextension, although there may be reasons to 
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judge them problematic, and to leave it to proponents of sparse versions of AEN to replace my 
examples with others they judge more kosher. 
8.  It is important to notice that there are several ways to cast the doctrine that the identity of ascriptions 
of properties is an extensional matter that are not all equivalent to my Extensionalist Axiom, although 
they share its spirit. In particular, the Extensionalist axiom is based on the assumption that individuals 
and propositions have the same modal (and temporal) profile. Given the Extensionalist Axiom, if 
individuals are identical across possible worlds, if they are transworld individuals, so are 
propositions; but if the identity of individuals is fixed to a world, if they are worldbound, then so is 
the identity of propositions. Yet some proponents of AEN may disagree with this assumption. For 
instance, Lewis conceived of propositions as sets of possible worlds and of possibilia (possible 
individuals) as worldbound. True-hearted Lewisian proponents of AEN will thus prefer to formulate 
the identity conditions for propositions in terms of usual identity conditions for sets. But this suggests 
that, for them, a proposition is identical across the worlds that are its members, despite the fact that 
these worlds are wholly composed of numerically distinct worldbound individuals. Hence true-
hearted Lewisian proponents of AEN conceive of possibilia and propositions as having different 
modal profiles. I disagree with true-hearted Lewisians on this matter; cf. section 5. 
9.  Dropping the Thing Nominalism Axiom allows us to evade the difficulty only because the rejection of 
the Thing Nominalist Axiom is assumed to entail the rejection of the Extensionalist Axiom. It is 
noticeable that Quine (2008), to whom the coextension difficulty is usually associated, accommodates 
the coextension difficulty without denying either of the Thing Nominalist and the Extensionalist 
Axioms. As a fervent extensionalist, Quine concludes from alleged cases of coextension that 
properties lack a clear principle of individuation and that we should get rid of non-extensional 
property talk. According to him, the lesson of the difficulty is that “anything that can be described in 
terms of properties and not equally directly in terms of classes is unclear (…)”. Proponents of AEN 
agree with Quine’s repudiation of non-extensional discourse about properties because they purport to 
offer an extensionally adequate interpretation of our discourse about properties. But proponents of 
AEN disagree with Quine’s conclusion that this purpose cannot be attained. By denying that the 
analytic ambitions of AEN can be achieved Quine escapes the coextension difficulty by denying the 
Analysability Axiom. 
10.  One may believe that three-dimensionalist eternalists can solve this problem by indexing properties to 
times. However, indexing properties to times multiplies alleged cases of coextension. Suppose that 
the things that are red at t1 are all and only the things that are spicy at t1. If so, the indexed properties 
redt1 and spicyt1 are coextensive.  
11.  This is true even if properties are indexed to worlds as in McDaniel 2004, p. 140. Suppose there is a 
property of being renate in the actual world and a property of being cordate in the actual world. 
These two properties are coextensive even if we assume that the actual cordate particulars exist in 
other possible worlds in which some of them are not renate.  
12.  See, however, Ira Kiourti’s (2010) impressive defence of genuine modal realism about impossible 
worlds. 
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13.  Hearts are not kidneys, angles are not sides. So by saying that an organism has a part that is a heart 
and by saying that it has a part that is a kidney we are expressing different propositions, and by 
saying that a triangle has three angles (for parts) and by saying that it also has three sides (for parts) 
we are expressing different propositions.  
14.  Let me emphasise that in order to obtain a suitable counterpart theory for ascriptions of polyadic 
properties, the plural counterpart relation should be such that the relata of the plural counterpart 
relations can be pluralities of n-tuples (for n ≥ 1). 
15.  Notice that we may as well want to allow for plural quantification over worlds. 
16.  I shall make no mention of the plural version of the controversial postulate P5. 
17.  Extreme monists can adapt this strategy to alleged cases of temporary coextension by developing a 
plural version of a temporal counterpart theory and a temporal counterpart theory for propositions. 
18.  According to the version of linguistic ersatzism that I have in mind, possible worlds, actualised and 
non-actualised, are maximal-consistent descriptions of the only concrete world, namely the actual 
one. Each possible world represents what is true and what is false in the actual world but only one 
world (the actualised one) is a faithful representation of what is true and what is false. By 
representing what is true and what is false in the concrete world, the sentences that together form 
possible worlds represent propositions. The represented propositions, which can be thought of as set-
theoretical constructs, can be counterparts of each other. Douglas Ehring (this volume, chapter 7 n15) 
wonders how a thing nominalist who identifies properties with classes and combines a counterpart 
theory for properties with linguistic ersatzism could account for the classes that represent properties. 
But the present proposal, according to which properties are not identified with anything at all and 
which appeals to a counterpart theory for propositions instead of a counterpart theory for properties, 
is not challenged by Ehring’s worry.  
